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Mining investMent and a fiscal regiMe that 
proMotes the investMent: an inter-teMporal 
Model
aBstract
This paper aims to show how both mining company and government will improve financially by 
promoting the reinvestment of profits. It will start with a theoretical framework about the mining 
investing sustainability. Then, an inter-temporal model will be proposed to formalize, theoretically, 
how the reinvestment will improve, in present value, profits and revenues for both firm and government, 
respectively. Also, empirical evidence will be shown, particularly, for Peru and Chile. Then, an 
approach to strong sustainability in Peru will be set by explaining the main variables of sustainability 
in the Peruvian mining sector as well as its main sustainability items. Finally, some conclusions will 
be presented.1
JEL: C6, E23 
KeYWords: Cluster, Expenditure, Fiscal Regime, Government, Inter-temporal, Investment, 
Mining, Peru, Profit, Reinvestment, Revenue, Sustainability, Taxes
resUMen
El objetivo del documento es mostrar cómo la compañía minera y el gobierno mejorarán financieramente 
tras la promoción de la reinversión de beneficios. El documento comenzará con una base teórica 
acerca de la sostenibilidad de la inversión minera. Luego, un modelo intertemporal será propuesto 
para formalizar, teóricamente, cómo la reinversión mejorará, en valor presente, los beneficios e 
ingresos tanto para la firma como para el gobierno. También se mostrará una evidencia empírica, 
particularmente para Perú y Chile. Por último, se establecerá un enfoque de la fuerte sostenibilidad en 
el Perú, explicándose las principales variables de sostenibilidad en el sector minero peruano así como 
también sus particularidades. Finalmente, se mostrarán algunas conclusiones.
JEL: C6, E23 
palaBras claves: Clúster, Gastos, Régimen fiscal, Gobierno, Intertemporal, Inversión, 
Minería, Perú, Utilidades, Reinversión, Ingresos, Sostenibilidad, Impuestos
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introdUction
Natural resources are important factors of 
wealth for many economies around the world, 
particularly for countries endowed with oil, gas, 
and minerals. Some countries in Latin America 
and Caribbean (LAC) are not exceptions to this 
characteristic. Countries like Mexico (oil, gas, 
and mineral), Venezuela (oil and gas), Colombia 
(oil and gas), Chile (minerals), and Peru (oil, 
gas and minerals) are endowed with important 
reserves of natural resources.
A substantial element of natural resources 
endowed countries is related to how these 
resources contribute with their economic 
development. In fact, there are many examples 
in the developed world of natural resource-
rich countries that have improved considerable 
their levels of GDP, income and wealth using 
natural resources (Australia, Canada, the United 
State, and Scandinavian countries). In this 
context, natural resource wealth is positive for 
development; but, more importantly, various 
studies show that natural resource wealth 
becomes a real development asset when 
investments in skill, technological capacities, 
and good macroeconomic institutions and 
management2 are present.
This paper will start with a theoretical framework 
about the mining investing sustainability where 
institutionality and fiscal stability issues are 
addressed for Peru and Chile. Then, an inter-
temporal model will be proposed to formalize, 
theoretically, how the reinvestment will 
improve, in present value, profits and revenues 
for both firm and government, respectively. 
Also, empirical evidence will be shown 
for Peru and Chile, particularly, levels of 
explorations and productions for both countries 
will be exposed. Then, an approach to strong 
sustainability in Peru will be set by explaining 
its main variables such as tax regime, social 
agreement with communities, government´s 
revenues, regulatory regime, among others in 
the Peruvian mining sector as well as its main 
sustainability items such as people’s solidarity 
mining program, work for taxes, paperwork 
waiting time. Finally, some conclusions will be 
presented.
theoretical fraMeWorK
The exploitation activity of mineral resources 
transforms the resource rent of the natural 
capital into financial capital. To government, 
mineral resources (government´s property) 
are transformed in taxes, principally. For this 
reason, if the assumption of weak sustainability 
is accepted, then financial capital gained 
from the exploitation of mineral resources is 
more relevant to the people‘s welfare than the 
unexploited mineral resources. In this process, 
usually, the financial capitals can generate 
returns through business activities and will 
grow over time if parts or all of these capitals 
are reinvested properly. Consequently, under 
these assumptions, the mineral resources should 
be optimally exploited in such a way that 
renders maximum economic rents, through time 
(Arnonkitpanich, 2009). 
Moreover, according to Brekke (1997), “a 
development is … said to be weakly sustainable 
if the development is non-diminishing from 
generation to generation. This is by now the 
dominant interpretation of sustainability.” 
In addition, according to this author, the 
strong sustainability sees sustainability as 
non-diminishing life opportunities, in other 
words, the sustainability should be achieved 
by conserving the stock of human capital, 
technological capability, natural resources and 
environmental quality.
On the other hands, from an economic 
perspective, the idea to maximize the present 
value through time of the economic rents obtained 
from the extraction of mineral resources was 
firstly introduced in a renowned article named 
“The Economics of Exhaustible Resources”, 
which was written by Harold Hotelling in 
1931. This Hotelling’s article did not talk 
about sustainability, but his model has become 
the basic of many later works that involve the 
optimal natural resources exploitation. Under 
some assumptions, the Hotelling‘s Rule say: if 
the level of production is always positive for 
all time periods and such production does not 
generate the extinction of the resource in a period 
of time equivalent, an optimal production path 
of non-renewable natural resources is achieved 
by the natural resources owner. In other words, 
the Hotelling‘s Rule finds the best or optimal 
moment to extract the reserves of the natural 
resource and, the same time, finds the process of 
maximizing of the benefits of the owner of the 
resource (Gómez, 1994).2 Perry, G., “Natural Resources, Neither Curse nor Destiny”, The 
World Bank (2007).
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With this conceptual framework, an economic 
model to obtain the optimal depletion path 
of mineral resources of two countries will be 
developed in this section. These countries will 
be Chile and Peru. Specifically, we will evaluate 
the relationship between mining investment and 
a fiscal regime that promotes this investment, 
taking into account an inter-temporal model. To 
analyze this relationship, first at all it is important 
to mention that the Hotelling´s model will be 
complemented incorporating a factor that works 
to promote the mining investment over the time, 
mainly exploration investment to increase the 
reserve. In other words, we will assume that a 
mining company can invest in the future part of 
its profit generated in the current period because 
the mining fiscal regime promotes this behavior, 
for instance mining companies can re-invest part 
of their profit and pay less taxes as Chilean case.
In fact, until 2012, in Chile the income tax rate 
was 20% and the withholding tax on dividends 
rate was 35% on dividends, less income tax 
or corporate tax credit. In this case, Chilean 
mining fiscal regimen promoted significantly the 
mining investment because if a mining company 
did not distribute dividends and re-invests its 
profits it paid 20% only, but if the company 
distributed dividends and did not re-invest it 
paid 35%. In contrast, in Peru, the income tax 
rate was 30% under the general tax regime 
and the withholding tax on dividends rate was 
4.1% on dividends of profits to non-domiciled 
and individuals by domiciled companies and 
by branches, permanent establishments and 
agencies of foreign companies. The difference 
was clear, Chilean mining fiscal regime was 
more promoting of the mining re-investment 
than Peruvian mining fiscal regime.
Another fundamental issue that needs to be 
considered in this section is the stability and 
credibility of the mining fiscal regime and the 
time inconsistency problem, principally in 
countries where the institutionality of the fiscal 
regime is weak or is in progress. Generally, the 
mining agreements between the company and the 
state are from 10 to 30 years. One of the principal 
reasons that explain why the exploitation of 
mineral resources is carried out with long-term 
agreements is referred to the following issue: 
the balance of power changes during the life of 
the mining project. Before the production starts, 
the power is in the hands of mining companies 
because countries around the world compete to 
attract investors to their respective jurisdictions.
Then, once the project begins to develop and 
produce, this power shifts from the mining 
company to the State, consequently, in countries 
with institutions that often change the mining tax 
regime, the political pressures towards contract 
renegotiation can be almost irresistible to change 
original contract or establish a new mining 
taxes if the company does not have stability 
agreements. In the final stage of the project, when 
the mining reserve or deposit is almost exhausted, 
this balance of power change again. The mining 
company may abandon the project if it concludes 
that the state requires too much.
In this context, according to Philip and Sunley 
(2010), fiscal stability clauses in mining 
agreements or stability contracts are generally 
justified by the following reasons: i) the 
large size and the sunken nature of the initial 
investment, ii) often a long period required 
to recover investment and earn a reasonable 
return, and iii) a lack of credibility on behalf of 
the host country to abstain from changing the 
fiscal rules once the investment is sunk, the time 
inconsistency problem. This is the reason why 
mining enterprises sings stability contract with 
the government to reduce the sovereign risk.
Taking into account these issues, we will 
describe a math model which assumes that the 
mining companies can re-invest part of its profit 
in the next periods to discover (exploration 
activities), develop and exploitation new mining 
reserves. This re-investing profit generates new 
reserve, new production and new profit and this 
new profit is re-invested by the mining company 
in the future. In other words, in the time, the 
re-investing profit generates new mines, and 
consequently the mining reserves change in the 
time. Moreover, to treating a mineral resource as 
an infinite stock because the re-investing profit 
generates new mines, the Hotelling model is 
simplified by making the following assumptions:
i. The goal of mining is to maximize the 
present value of net benefits from extraction.
ii. The resource stock of mine is homogeneous.
iii. The mining industry is perfectly competitive.
iv. The current and future costs of extraction 
and market price of the mineral are known.
v. The quantity of mineral stock changes in the 
time, explaining by re-investment of profit 
to discover new mines.
vi. The mine has unlimited production capacity 
and there is no technological advance.
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an inter-temporal model
To build a math expression of this idea, we begin 
with a basic specification of profit Πt+s( ) , which 
includes taxes paid by the mining companies. 
In this model we assume that there are two tax 
rates, one of them is the tax rate paid by the 
mining company according to a general fiscal 
regime τ1( ) , but if the company re-invests part 
of its profit in exploration activities it pays a 
less tax rat τ2( ) . The mining company´s revenue 
and total cost are pqt+s  and qt+s2 , respectively. We 
assume that the total cost depends positively of 
the production. Additionally, in the following 
equation, the percentage of profit that the 
mining company re-invests in the next period 
is represented as γ and the parameter ϕ  is a 
factor that transforms the mining company´s re-
investing profit in new profit in the next period. 
Consequently, the basic specification of profit 
will be the following expression:
Equation 1
Πt+s = (1−α) pqt+s − qt+s2 +θt+s (1−α) pqt+s−1 − qt+s−12( )( )
In the last expression, we will assumes that 
θt+s = γϕ( )t+s , where ϕ  represents the percentage of 
profit that is re-invested in the next period and  γϕ  
represents the percentage of re-investment that 
becomes profit3. Furthermore, the restriction of 
the mining company is defined by xt+s+1 − xt+s = −qt+s  
and α = τ1 −ψ τ1 −τ2( ) . Also, the stock and control 
variables are represented by the reserves, xt+1 , 
and the production,qt , respectively.  
The solutions for stock and control variables are:
Equation 2
xt+1 =
1
1+ A Axt +
1− A
2 p
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
qt =
1
1+ A( )
xt −
1− A
2 p
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
According to the last two equations, there are 
positive relationships between the deviation 
of tax rates τ1 −τ2( ) and the mining stock and 
production, as it is showed in the following 
figure.
Figure 1
Mining stock, production and tax rates
(Theoretical)
Source: Own elaboration
The objective of this model is to show that 
the future mining stock xt+1( ) changes in the 
time and it depends negatively of the tax rate. 
Specifically, if the difference between τ1  and τ2  
increases, the mining company´s re-investment 
in exploration activities and the mining stock 
rise in the future. In other words, if a mining 
fiscal regime promotes mining re-investment in 
exploration activities, this regime will permit 
to discover new mines and, consequently, new 
3 See Appendix 1 to see how we obtain the optimal expressions 
for control and stock variables throughout a Lagrangian as well 
as the parameters value. 
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reserves in the future. In this context, there will 
not be conflict between the mining company 
and the government to obtain profits and fiscal 
revenues, respectively. Both company´s benefit 
and government´s revenue will increase as result 
of exploitation old and new mines. Only if there 
are not discovered new mines, the benefits of 
the unique mine in operation will be disputed by 
the mining company and the government. The 
gain of one of them will be the lost of the other 
participant. 
This issue is showed by the solution for 1+tx  
which indicates how both company´s present 
value of profit and government´s present 
value of revenue will rise when new mines 
are discovered and exploited as a result of a 
fiscal legal framework that promotes the re-
investment. This equation shows that the present 
values of company´s profit and government´s 
revenue with discovered new mines are more 
significant than present values of company´s 
profit and government´s revenue without 
discovered new mines and the mining company 
operates one mine only. Using the solution for 
1+tx  showed before and the parameters selected, 
the following figure presents this theoretical 
comparison.
Figure 2
Comparison of present values: simulated with 60 years
(Theoretical)
Source: Own elaboration
empirical evidence: chile and peru
The theoretical framework just outlined 
provides a potential basis for analysis of changes 
in the main variables mentioned before. Taking 
into account the available information, in the 
present section we will describe the behavior of 
theses main variables for Chile and Peru cases. 
Firstly, we start describing how the total mining 
investment and exploration mining investment 
have changed in both countries in the last twenty 
two years. Specifically, it is important to show 
that Chilean mining investment has been major 
than Peruvian mining investment, both in total 
and exploration investment. As a result, the 
Chilean copper reserves have increased highly 
until 2016. 
In Peruvian case, the following figure shows that 
its copper reserves has been around to 80 millions 
of tons in the last ten years, there was not an 
important change in this variable in that period. 
Another aspect that the following figure shows is 
the Peruvian mining investment in explorations 
activities is less productive than Chilean case. 
Two things that explain this problem are difficult 
regulatory regime and social agreement with the 
communities, definitely.
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Figure 3
Chile Perú
Mining Investment
(Millions of dollar)
Copper reserves
(Millions of Tons)
Source: US Geological Survey, Ministry of Mining and Energy (Peru) and Ministry of Mining (Chile)
More mining investment and reserves produce 
more tons of minerals, and new mines start 
operation. The following figures show how 
many new mines have started their operations 
in these countries, promoting by a mining fiscal 
regime which promotes mining investments. 
In Chilean case, it is considered the private 
production only because this sector has been 
more dynamic than public sector. In 1992, 60% 
and 40% of the Chilean copper production were 
produced by public company (Codelco) and 
private companies, respectively. This structure 
has changed in the last years. In 2016, only 31% 
of the Chilean copper production was produced 
by public company and 69% was produced by 
private companies. In contrasts, in Peruvian 
case, all mines have been privates in the last 
twenty five years. 
We can see that the production of new mines in 
Chile has been more significant than Peruvian`s 
new mines. In other words, in Chile the mining 
company´s re-investment and the number of new 
mines in operations have risen more significant 
than Peru, encouraging by a mining fiscal 
regime that promotes mining re-investment 
which permits to discover new mines and, 
consequently, the production. In this Figure, 
mines that have started its operations since 1993 
are considered as new mines.
In addition, compared with Peru, Chile not only 
has increased its copper production but also 
has increased the number of operating mines 
and the level of mining reserves and stocks. 
In Chile, the new main mines that have started 
their operations since 1993 were Collahuasi, 
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Los pelambres, Spence, El Abra, Zaldivar, and 
Candelaria, all mines with levels of production 
upper than one hundred and thousand tons by 
year. In contrast, since this year, in Peru the 
Antamina mine, and recently Toromocho and 
Las Bambas, have been the unique new mines 
that started operations with a level of production 
upper than one hundred and thousand tons by 
year. Moreover, since 1992, the Chile´s copper 
reserve has improved compared whit Peru´s 
copper reserve.
Another important element that we need to 
consider in this analysis is how the government`s 
revenues generating by the mining sectors have 
increased in the twenty last years. The following 
figure shows that in Chile the mining fiscal 
revenues have increased faster than Peru, as 
result of the attractive mining tax regime that 
has Chile. This is contrasted when the mining 
sector´s accumulated private taxes of Chile and 
Peru are compared. The accumulated private 
tax ratio, which is defined as the accumulated 
private taxes of Chile divides by the accumulated 
private taxes of Peru, has increased steadily in 
the last years.
In part, these rise on Chilean tax revenues 
reflected a generous fiscal regime designed to 
attract new investment through re-investment 
system of profits. Chilean mining fiscal regimen 
promotes significantly the mining investment 
because if a mining company did not distribute 
dividends and re-invested its profits the mining 
company paid 20% only, but if the company 
distributed dividends and did not re-invest it 
paid 35%.
Figure 4
Production and government´s revenues
Chile PerúCopper production
(Thousand fine Tons)
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Total fiscal of government´s revenues mines
(Millions of dollars)
Source: Ministry of Mining and Energy (Peru) and Ministry of Mining (Chile)
An important issue of Chile and Peru´s fiscal 
regimes is related to the stability contracts and 
income tax (corporate tax). In Chile, if the 
taxpayer has elected to enter into a Stabilization 
Agreement or Mining Contract, the rate is up to 
2 percentage points over the income tax rate; 
however, in Peru, if the taxpayer has elected to 
enter into a Stabilization Agreement or Mining 
Contract, the rate is up to 2 percentage points 
over the income tax rate (Law 27343). Mining 
companies that invest in Peru usually sing a 
Stabilization Agreement, which guarantees the 
holders of mining activities, the current tax 
regime, including the income tax, on the date of 
approval of the investment program.
In a re-invest scope, a proposal could be investing 
what the country earns by granting stability 
in activities that contribute with its sustained 
growth towards prosperity, that is, stability with 
sustainability. In this way, stability is achieved 
with “win-win”. Indeed, for the country to 
achieve first world standards of living requires 
greater investment to increase its reserves and 
at the same time to invest more resources in 
innovation, mainly to gain productivity through 
innovation in any of its modalities; innovating in 
processes, products or technology. 
To obtain this goal, a fiscal framework that 
promotes the reinvestment of profits tends to 
increase reserves and consequently the levels of 
production: virtuous circle of taxation that allows 
the investor and the State to earn at the same 
time; and greater productivity in the sectors with 
the greatest potential. In this context, under an 
investment for sustainability scope, it is essential 
that the Income Tax of stability contracts (up to 
2 percentage points) be allocated to promote 
investment in mining exploration and innovation, 
in general, to promote a developed sector of 
Mining Equipment, Technology and Services 
(METS) or mining cluster. This proposal includes 
companies with stability contracts; they would 
not pay 2 percentage points for Income Tax for 
stability as long as it is destined to expenses 
in exploration and innovation in productive 
processes (transversal) and the generation of 
competitive competitors. Also, the condition of 
stability would not be lost.
an approach to strong 
sUstainaBilitY in perU
Following to Brekke (1997) a strong sustainable 
is sustainability as non-diminishing life 
opportunities, as conserving the stock of 
human capital, technological capability, natural 
resources and environmental quality. In fact, 
taking into account a large scope, we consider 
that the strong sustainable not only will 
consider conserving the stock of human capital, 
technological capability, natural resources and 
environmental quality, buy also increasing or 
better theses aspects. 
Consequently, in this step is very important 
that we will answer the following question. 
What must the rate 2t  include? How we can 
include others items which explain the strong 
sustainable? For this reason, not only this rate 
must include taxes or all items that mining 
companies pay to government (tax approach), 
but also how these government´s revenues are 
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used (public expense approach). In this context, 
we consider all direct and indirect issues that 
impact the sustainability. The following figure 
shows how these variables are related with this 
concept.
Figure 5
Main variables of sustainability in the mining sector
Source: own elaboration
In the last figure we can observe the relationship 
between tax regime and sustainability, through 
exploration investment and mining production. 
An important issue related to exploitation of 
mining resources is to determine whether the 
objective is to maximize the fiscal revenue in the 
short or in the long term. If the goal is short-
term maximization, the mining fiscal system 
needs to impose a high effective tax rate, but 
it is too high, burden on individual mines will 
be too heavy, and consequently in the long run 
there will be fewer mines, thus fewer taxpayers, 
a narrower tax base, and a smaller contribution 
to the government. A good mining fiscal system 
will strive to set the optimal effective tax rate 
where an optimal balance is found. In this case, 
if a mining fiscal regime promotes mining re-
investment, this regime will permit to discover 
new mines and, consequently, new reserves 
in the future. For this reason, there will not be 
conflict between the mining company and the 
government to obtain profits and fiscal revenues 
respectively. Both company´s benefit and 
government´s revenue will increase as result of 
exploitation old and new mines. Only if there 
are not discovered new mines, the benefits of the 
unique mine in operation will be disputed by the 
mining company and the government.
This idea is analyzed with our inter-temporal 
model which assumes that the mining companies 
can re-invest part of its profit in the next periods 
to discover, develop and exploit new mining 
reserves. This re-investing profit generates new 
reserve, new production and new profit and this 
new profit is re-invested by the mining company 
in the future. In other words, in the time, the 
re-investing profit generates new mines, and 
consequently the mining reserves change in the 
time. The objective of this model is to show 
that the future stock of minerals changes in the 
time and it depends negatively of the tax rate. 
With a mining fiscal regime that promotes the 
mining investment, principally in exploration 
4 The appendix section show a complete numbers of factors 
that influences over company decisions to invest in various 
jurisdictions, according to Fraser Institute.
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stage, the present values of company´s profit 
and government´s revenue with discovered new 
mines are more significant than present values 
of company´s profit and government´s revenue 
without discovered new mines and the mining 
company operates one mine only.
tackling particular issues
On the other hand, the social agreement 
with communities and an adequate use of 
government’s revenues encompass two aspects 
that we need to analyze in this section to a 
better compression of the sustainability. During 
the first stages of private mining, 90´s years, 
the State was practically inexistent regarding 
the relationship between local communities 
and mining investors. A poor environmental 
regulation and inexistent financial resources to 
communities were part of these years. In the 
following the decade of 2000´s, mining sector 
has grown significantly regarding its importance 
in the Peruvian economy. It has probably been 
the engine behind the successful economic 
growth, especially during when international 
mineral prices skyrocketed. At the same time, 
social conflicts began to rise in the country, 
especially in the mining areas. 
So, we are able to mention three common 
problems in local governments directly related 
to mining project.
Changes done in the 2000´s decade related to 
Mining Canon did not showed the expected 
results. It is true that local governments’ revenues 
increased because of canon and royalties but 
there have not been an adequate expenditure 
capacity; that is, the level of expenditure as 
percentage of revenue has been decreasing and 
most of the money is just gaining interests on a 
bank account. Furthermore, this lack of capacity 
is highly related to lack of technical expertise 
among public workers who cannot fulfill public 
investment requirements stated by Peruvian 
laws. The nearly inexistent expenditure capacity 
is also due to corruption issues which is present 
not only in local governments but also in the 
central government.
Likewise the lack of expenditure quality 
is another crucial problem present on local 
governments whose investments are a little bit 
unproductive. That is most of the expenditure 
is concentrated on increasing public workers 
salary due to local governments´ high revenues. 
Also, unproductive infrastructure is also 
common. That is, other projects are prioritized 
instead of electricity or sewers connections and 
the governor is also agree because it not only 
allows him to be more popular among local 
people but also gaining votes if reelection is the 
main concern. Then, the low quality of capital 
expenditure is characterized unproductive public 
infrastructure because it has no impact on local 
potential gross domestic product.
Another problem deals with poor targeting 
expenditure. This problem is similar to lack 
of expenditure quality mentioned above; that 
is, local government usually does not spend 
in favor of communities directly related to the 
mining project. It is because of they are not high 
population communities where the governor 
cannot get votes for future elections. Then, it is 
only infrastructure that will have no long term 
impact on those communities. In contrast, the 
governor would rather to spend most of those 
revenues on zones which have more population 
and gain more votes in the future. Then, the 
local government indirectly promotes that the 
mining deals with the development of those 
communities.
Those three problems mentioned are present 
in spite of there is bill which states that the 
municipality directly related to the mining 
project gets the 3% and 10% of the total cannon 
and royalties, respectively.
As a solution, the government implemented 
several measures to ease the political pressure. 
Perhaps the most significant one was distributing 
mining fiscal income among the region, the 
provinces and the districts where the mine 
operated and from where the natural resource was 
extracted. At the same time, mining firms began 
spending more on corporate social responsibility 
and became more involved in social development 
activities in their influence areas. Of course, this 
is not exclusive to the Peruvian case; it is part of 
an attempt of International Financial Institutions 
and transnational mining companies to build 
an image of a more responsible and more 
development oriented mining industry.
In this context, the Peruvian government 
created the People’s Solidarity Mining Program 
(PMSP – Programa Minero de Solidaridad con 
el Pueblo) created in 2006. It was a context of 
mineral international prices sky rocketing, and 
some politicians claimed for contracts with 
stability tax agreements with mining companies 
to be revised and for mining enterprises to pay 
over profit tax. 
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The first proposal was not viable as it would 
imply the Peruvian government could be 
involved in judiciary problems for not fulfilling 
a contract signed earlier. And as an answer to the 
second claim, the Peruvian government offered 
a solution in agreement with mining companies 
where the latter ones would not pay over profit 
tax, but in exchange they committed to invest 
during the next five years a predetermined 
amount in social development projects in their 
operations’ influence areas.
Once these elements have been described, 
there are currently few concrete, efficient and 
promising tools for the development of the 
population related to the Socio-Environmental 
Economic Influence Area of  the mining projects. 
The non-renewal of the Mining Program of 
Solidarity with the Community (MPSC), the most 
important tool available to allocate resources 
from the MC and MR for local and regional 
governments (either by WfT, subcontract or 
public direct investment) added to the lack of 
incentives mentioned above, there is little room 
for effective intervention.
In 2007 another program was created by the 
Ministry of Economy and Finances to help the 
mining industry gain support from the population 
without having to disburse additional money, it 
was called “Works for Taxes”. The Law 29230 
and rules were issued in 2008, and the scheme 
is now used not only by mining companies, but 
also by banks, telephone companies, cement 
and even beer companies, among others, to 
reinforce their social responsibility programs. 
“Works for Taxes” is a scheme under which 
any company can pay up to 50% of their profit 
tax through building public infrastructure 
chosen by a regional or local government, and 
in exchange the company receives Certificates 
for a total amount equivalent to the value of the 
infrastructure work which they can use during 
the next ten years to pay taxes to the Central 
Government.
The regional or local government receiving 
the infrastructure must pay to the Central 
Government during the next years the total 
amount of the infrastructure work with their 
determined resources transfers (which include 
canon, royalties and other transfers as customs). 
This scheme brings ahead benefits from public 
infrastructure projects, as usually traditional 
procurement take much longer. In this case, the 
Regional or Local Government does not have to 
worry about the execution of the infrastructure, 
they just hire a Supervisor and give the 
conformity when the job is done. For the private 
enterprises, it is beneficial as their recover the 
whole amount of the investment (plus a 2% 
annual rate for inflation) and they associate the 
company image with high impact infrastructure 
projects. Plus, during the building process, local 
employment can be generated, and after the 
work is finished, operation and maintenance 
presents opportunities for local providers. 
The limit for building infrastructure under the 
scheme Works for Taxes is determined by the 
“determined resources transfers” each Regional 
or Local Government receives. The Ministry of 
Economy and Finances set the limit according to 
the transfers received during the last three years.
Figure 6
Main sustainability items
Works for taxes
(Accumulated)Paperwork Waiting Time (in days)
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Paperwork Waiting Time (in days)
Southern Main Projects Map
(Mining projects , ports and logistics corridors) 
Annual Cooper Production  
Southern Zone -2016
(Thousands of MT) 
In addition, the Peruvian mining sector has a 
complex regulatory regime.  It is necessary 
to organize and reduce the permits required 
for mining, which have grown exponentially 
in recent years along with the creation of new 
institutions that have been dismembered from 
others. While only ten years ago, the Ministry 
of Energy and Mines (MINEM) was the only in 
charged of granting almost all permits, almost 
completely reviewed environmental studies and 
supervised matters of safety and environment.
Currently, an Environmental Impact Study (EIS) 
is being reviewed by more than seven institutions, 
led by the General Directorate of Environmental 
Mining Affairs (GDEMA) of MINEM, which has 
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just transferred its faculties to the newly created 
SENACE, but only for detailed Environmental 
Impact Studies (EIS-d), which will cause a 
“bottleneck” because MINEM is the only 
specialist and has the experience to do so, the 
other seven institutions do not count on defined 
criteria, nor guidelines or clear procedures for 
reviewing an EIS. Therefore, the company will 
not have “one single window” in SENACE, 
because it will have to seek authorization in 
each institution that should review its study, so 
the promised period of 150 days for revision will 
not comply.
In terms of mining safety issues, ten years ago 
the General Directorate of Mining (GDM)) 
of the MINEM dictated the policies, took the 
statistics and supervised. Currently, the Ministry 
of Labor and Employment Promotion (MTPE) 
is responsible for supervising the safety of “the 
worker”, the Supervisory Organization for 
Investment in Energy and Mining (SOIEM) 
for the safety of “the facilities”, and the 
National Center of Occupational Health and 
Protection of the Environment for health at work 
(NCOHPE). The GDM and the first two require 
reports for their statistics, yet none has any 
responsibility for the coordination between the 
institutions, the updating of the regulations, or 
the simultaneous fines for the same event, which 
have been increased and with the argument 
of “cost avoided” discretionalities have been 
introduced.
Regarding the control of environmental 
obligations, the Agency for Environmental 
Evaluation and Control (AEEC) has taken 
responsibility, however that has not had 
any technical-reference effect. The current 
administration has excelled to obtain resources 
with a “Contribution for Regulation”, increase 
the discretion and the amount of the fines, and 
make any appeal difficult. What is more, the 
AEEC aims to have its own laboratory that can 
make its decisions more arbitrary.
In this context, the permit procedures regarding 
authorizations, permits, licenses and in general 
any type of administrative documentation 
required to the mining industry in any stages are 
very complex and remark capacity institutional 
as insufficient and inefficient. Consequently, 4 
to 6 years are the total needed for the approval.
Finally, a cluster is defined as a geographical 
concentration of interconnected companies, 
specialized suppliers, service providers, 
companies in related industries and associative 
entities. That geographical site can be a city, 
a region, a country, etc. In the last 15 years 
the Peruvian mining sector has contributed 
significantly to the development of the 
country. Important projects, mainly copper’s 
have started operating, which, together with 
the expansion of production, have allowed the 
generation of employment and fiscal resources 
for 100 billion soles nationwide. This dynamic 
has made possible important levels of copper 
production in the country; about 2.5 million tons 
per year, being 70% in southern Peru. In labor 
terms, currently in the south mining directly 
generates 76,500 jobs, which, added to the 
indirect ones exceeds half a million jobs. Why 
are these magnitudes and volumes of production 
important? Because following experiences such 
as the Australian or Canadian, our country has the 
natural resources to raise its production through 
the development of an advanced mining cluster 
located initially in the south. That is, promote 
an industrial agglomeration with interconnected 
companies, highly specialized suppliers, 
companies in related industries and associative 
entities, all with the aligned view of producing 
goods and services on a global scale. This vision 
of development would allow the Peruvian south 
to raise one and a half million direct and indirect 
highly specialized jobs associated with the 
cluster in the coming years.
conclUsions 
Natural resources constitute a great advantage 
for countries to improve their development 
and ensure its sustainability. The sustainable 
development is not only a non-diminishing issue 
but also an issue which deals with conserving the 
stock of human capital, technological capability, 
natural resources and environmental quality.
The incentive for reinvestment profits (in 
exploration activities and innovation, mainly) 
by reducing the income tax is great alternative 
to keep the sustainable development in a country 
which is highly dependent on natural resources, 
in this case mining; moreover, there is evidence 
(Chile) which supports empirically this incentive 
is a good alternative. The inter-temporal model 
helps us to show formally this fact where both 
mining company and the government improve 
their profits and revenues, respectively.
During the first stages of private mining in Peru, 
90´s years, the State was practically inexistent: 
a poor environmental regulation and inexistent 
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financial resources to local communities. In the 
2000´s decade Peruvian mining sector has grown 
significantly regarding its importance in the 
economy. In fact, the mining sector dynamism 
has been one of the main engines behind the 
successful economic growth, especially during 
when international mineral prices were so high. 
In spite of some improvements, some other 
problems came about. Those problems are related 
to inefficiency in terms on quantity and quality 
on the expenditure from local governments’ 
side. That is given the increasing revenues 
as consequence of mining activity the capital 
expenditure which has a positive repercussion 
on local communities’ potential gross domestic 
product has been small. In addition, if take into 
account corruption problems among governors, 
things turn worse.
Finally, Peruvian central government adopted 
some measures or main items to improve the 
environment such that firms and households 
get a sustainable development. They are 
Social-Mining program, Works for taxes, and 
Paperwork Waiting time. Although those items 
help to improve the mining activity and the 
economic sustainability, they are susceptible to 
be improved. Also it is important to promote the 
mining cluster and/or METS through the Income 
Tax of stability contracts to keep a virtuous circle 
of investment sustainability. 
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appendiX 1
Then the Lagrangian, with the discount rate r  (where β = 11+ r  ), is defined by the following expression:
L = β s (1−α) pqt+s − qt+s2 +θt+s (1−α) pqt+s−1 − qt+s−12⎡⎣ ⎤⎦⎡⎣ ⎤⎦+λt+s xt+s − xt+s+1 − qt+s[ ]{ }
s=0
∞
∑
L = β s (1−α) pqt+s − qt+s2⎡⎣ ⎤⎦+β sθt+s (1−α)2 pqt+s−1 − qt+s−12⎡⎣ ⎤⎦+λt+s xt+s − xt+s+1 − qt+s[ ]{ }
s=0
∞
∑
qt+s[ ] :β s 1−α( ) p− 2qt+s[ ]−λt+s +β s+1θt+s+1(1−τ )2 p− 2qt+s[ ] = 0 ...(1)
xt+s[ ] :λt+s −λt+s−1 = 0 ...(2)
1−α( ) p− 2qt+s[ ] 1+β 1−α( )θt+s+1⎡⎣ ⎤⎦= λt+s
Doing 1=s  (two periods),  2+tx  = 0, and considering (1) and (2), we obtain:
1−α( ) p− 2qt+1[ ] 1+β 1−α( )θt+2⎡⎣ ⎤⎦− 1−α( ) p− 2qt[ ] 1+β 1−α( )θt+1⎡⎣ ⎤⎦= 0
p− 2qt+1[ ]
p− 2qt[ ]
=
1+βθt+1(1−α)[ ]
1+βθt+2 (1−α)[ ]
2Aqt − 2qt+1 = Ap− p ...(3) ; where : A =
1+βθt+1(1−α)[ ]
1+βθt+2 (1−α)[ ]
Then, linking the restriction and the equation number 3, we have: 
2A xt − xt+1( )− 2 xt+1( ) = −p(1− A)
⇒ xt+1 =
1
1+ A Axt +
1− A
2 p
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
.......... (4)
⇒ qt =
1
1+ A( )
xt −
1− A
2 p
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
.......... (5)
parameters:
0.35 0.35
0.20 0.30
0.50 0.50
0.25 0.25
0.95 0.95
0.20 0.20
Xt 20.00 20.00
p 10.00 10.00
Parameters
1
2


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appendiX 2
1. Uncertainty concerning the administration, 
interpretation, or enforcement of existing 
regulations.
2. Uncertainty concerning environmental 
regulations (stability of regulations, 
consistency and timeliness of regulatory 
process, regulations not based on science).
3. Regulatory duplication and inconsistencies 
(includes federal/provincial, federal/state, 
inter-departmental overlap, etc.).
4. Legal system (legal processes that are fair, 
transparent, non-corrupt, timely, efficiently 
administered, etc.).
5. Taxation regime (includes personal, 
corporate, payroll, capital, and other taxes, 
and complexity of tax compliance).
6. Uncertainty concerning disputed land 
claims.
7. Uncertainty concerning what areas will 
be protected as wilderness, parks, or 
archeological sites, etc.
8. Infrastructure (includes access to roads, 
power availability, etc.).
9. Socioeconomic agreements/community 
development conditions (includes local 
purchasing or processing requirements, 
or supplying social infrastructure such as 
schools or hospitals, etc.).
10. Trade barriers (tariff and non-tariff barriers, 
restrictions on profit repatriation, currency 
restrictions, etc.).
11. Political stability.
12. Labor regulations/employment agreements 
and labor militancy/work disruptions.
13. Quality of the geological database (includes 
quality and scale of maps, ease of access to 
information, etc.).
14. Level of security (includes physical security 
due to the threat of attack by terrorists, 
criminals, guerrilla groups, etc.).
15. Availability of labor/skills.
